The National Interest2016.3.4---Harry J. Kazianis :美國與中國的戰爭真的可能嗎？

The National Interest2016.3.4---Harry J. Kazianis :Hell Cometh to Earth: Is a U.S.-China War Really Possible?
Is a war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China really possible?
On the surface, the idea seems quite silly. Washington and Beijing sport two-way trade equal to over a half a trillion dollars. China holds trillions more in U.S. debt. America educates scores of Chinese students in our public and private universities—over 300,000 young and scholarly minds. Chinese immigrants have become a rich part of American culture. How could such a conflict really occur considering such interwoven connections that span in some instances centuries?
My snap reaction: whoever said war was always the most logical of choices?
Indeed, despite countless areas of mutual interest, relations between Beijing and Washington are clearly on the decline. Some of this is easily explained—both sides during the Cold War feared the Soviet Union more than each other and worked together to contain Moscow. Losing a common enemy was certainly going to create a challenge.
However, with what can only be described as a ring of tensions running from the East China Sea all the way to the very ends of the South China Sea, from allegations of cyber espionage on both sides to comments from high-level military officials that seem more menacing by the day, it seems a clash of some sorts is increasingly possible.
As someone who has been interested in this topic for almost a decade and being an editor/executive editor of not one but two of the world’s best foreign policy publications around, I have been able to work with scholars who have a variety of thoughts on the subject. While I could recommend multiple articles on the subject, the best for sheer readability that has stood the test of time is Robert Farley’s work back in 2014 in this very publication titled Asia’s Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War. His piece sought to answer the question: “what series of events could lead to war in East Asia, and how would that war play out?”.
Farley, to his credit, does not get bogged down in overly wonky details, but gives the reader a narrative that is easy to follow, seems realistic and does not over sensationalize the topic. He explains that “in this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical details. . . and more on the strategic objectives of the major combatants before, during, and after the conflict.” Farley also understands the stakes at play, noting that “a war between the United States and China would transform some aspects of the geopolitics of East Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors unchanged. Tragically, a conflict between China and the U.S. might be remembered only as “The First Sino-American War.”
While I of course urge you to read the whole long-form piece, here are some of the highlights.
How Does It Start
Here, Farley makes some very logical assumptions concerning the moves both sides would make and decisions that would need to follow:
“If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down.”
Assuming China does make a “push forward”, economics will be a big factor in such a conflict:
“On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial production.”

The Goals of Both Sides
Here, Farley demonstrates clearly the possible aims and goals of the United States:
“The U.S. will pursue the following war aims: 1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN); 2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF); 3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland.” And for China:
“The PLA will pursue these ends: 1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose; 2. Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as possible; 3. Hurt America badly enough that future US governments will not contemplate intervention; 4. Disrupt the U.S.-led alliance system in East Asia.” Who Would Win?
While Farley does not declare a winner in his article, he does explain to his readers that the “war doesn’t end with a surrender signed on a battleship. Instead, it ends with one participant beaten, embittered, and likely preparing for the next round.” Below, Farley lays out conditions for both an American and Chinese victory:
“The best case scenario for an American victory would be a result akin to the collapse of the Imperial German government at the end of World War I, or the collapse of Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government after the Falklands conflict. Humiliating defeat in war, including the destruction of a significant portion of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as severe economic distress, could undermine the grip of the CCP on Chinese governance. This is an extremely iffy prospect, however, and the United States shouldn’t count on victory leading to a new revolution.
“What if China wins? China can claim victory by either forcing the United States into an accommodation to U.S. goals, or by removing the alliance framework that motivates and legitimates U.S. action. The United States cannot continue the war if South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines no longer have an interest in fighting. Either of these require doing significant damage to U.S. military forces and, potentially, to the US economy.”
And here is where things get very interesting:
“The impact of a defeat on U.S. domestic politics would be tough to predict. The United States has “lost” wars in the past, but these defeats have generally involved negotiated settlements of areas not particularly critical to U.S. global interests. It’s not clear how the US people would interpret a major military defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, especially a peer competitor that continues to grow in military and economic power. The President and political party that led the US into war would likely suffer dramatically at the polls, at least after the immediate shock of defeat wore off.”
The Real Danger: “The Window for War”
The greatest reason to fret over a future conflict between Washington and Beijing is the sheer amount of pressure points between them: The East China Sea, Taiwan, The South China Sea, North Korea, cyberattacks and/or cyber espionage that could go very wrong, a space-based military competition, increasing economic competition and so on. With none of these seem ripe for solving anytime soon, as Farley notes “the window for war between the United States and China will, in all likelihood, last for a long time.”
Thankfully there is some room for optimism. Clearly no one in either capital wants to see what would very likely end up being a war that would be global in nature. However, looking into the abyss every now and then sometimes provides the clarity needed for dialogue and hard-won compromise. Let’s hope U.S. and Chinese leaders are taking the long view of what could be many years of tense relations to come--coming to the realization that there would be no real “winners” in such a contest.
Harry Kazianis (@grecianformula) is a non-resident Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute as well as a fellow for National Security affairs at the Potomac Foundation. He is the former Executive Editor of The National Interest and former Editor-In-Chief of The Diplomat. The views expressed are his own.
Image: Flickr/U.S. Navy.


=============google 翻譯================

The National Interest2016.3.4---Harry J. Kazianis :美国与中国的战​​争真的可能吗？
是美国和中国的人民共和国之间的战争真的可能吗？
从表面上看，这个想法似乎很愚蠢的。华盛顿和北京体育双向贸易等于超过五千亿美元。中国拥有万亿以上的美国国债。美国教育的中国学生在我们的公立和私立的大学成绩，超过30万青年和学术思想。中国移民已经成为美国文化的一部分丰富。怎么会这样的冲突发生真正的考虑，在某些情况下，横跨百年交织等连接？
我的捕捉反应：谁说战争总是最合乎逻辑的选择？
事实上，尽管双方共同感兴趣的领域不计其数，北京和华盛顿之间的关系显然是在下降。一些这很容易解释，无论是在冷战时期双方担心苏联超过彼此合作共同遏制莫斯科。失去了共同的敌人当然是要创建一个挑战。
然而，只能被描述为中国东海一路跑到中国南海的最末端，从网络间谍两边指控从高级军事官员，似乎意见紧张的环由天更来势汹汹，似乎有些种类的冲突日益成为可能。
正如有人谁一直在这个话题感兴趣的将近十年，是不是一个而是两个世界上最好各地的外交政策出版物的编辑/执行编辑，我已经能够用谁拥有多种对思想的学者合作学科。虽然我可以推荐关于这个问题的多篇文章，最好的一个经受住了时间的考验纯粹的可读性罗伯特·法利的这个非常出版题为亚洲最大的恐惧在后面的工作在2014年：一个美国与中国的战​​争。他的作品试图回答这个问题：“什么系列的事件可能会导致东亚战争，怎么会战争打出来的？”
法利，他的功劳，没有得到过分中的细节靠不住越陷越深，但给读者叙述，很容易跟随，似乎逼真，不会过度炒作的话题。他解释说，“在这篇文章中我集中于较少的业务和战术细节。 。 。更加上主要的战斗人员的战略目标之前，期间和冲突后。“法利也明白在作怪的利害关系，指出：”美国和中国之间的战争将改变东亚的地缘政治的某些方面，但也留下许多的关键因素不变。可悲的是，中国和美国之间的冲突可能只记得“首届中美战争”。
虽然我当然希望你读整个长篇片，这里有一些亮点。
  它是如何开始
在这里，法利使得关于移动双方将使得和决定，将需要遵循一些非常合乎逻辑的假设：
“如果第一次世界大战的历史赋予任何迹象显示，解放军将不会允许美国为了充分调动要么发动第一击，还是好好准备接收第一打击。与此同时，罢工“晴天霹雳”的可能性不大。相反，正在酝酿的危机将会稳步升级了几件事，终于引发了一系列关于美军的部分步骤，表明了北京，华盛顿是真正准备打仗。这些步骤将包括涌动航母战斗群，来自欧洲和中东的部署转移到亚洲，并朝着太平洋移动战斗机中队。在这一刻，中国将需要决定是否推进或退缩。“
假设中国确实让“推进”，经济将在这种冲突的一个重要因素：
“在经济方面，北京和华盛顿都将新闻制裁（在美国的努力可能会涉及到多边努力），并且将冻结对方资产，以及那些任何共交战的。这将开始资本和整个消费环太平洋地区经济的疼痛，和世界其他地区。高强度作战的威胁，也将破坏全球航运模式，在工业生产造成潜在的严重瓶颈“。
  双方的目标
这里，法利清楚地表明了可能的目标和美国的目标：
“美国将采取下列战争目标：1.击败了解放军海军（PLAN）的肯定远征的目的; 2.销毁计划的进攻能力和人民解放军空军（PLAAF）; 3.潜在动摇中共政府在大陆的控制“。
而对于中国：
“解放军将追求这些目标：1.实现了肯定的远征的目的; 2.销毁尽可能多的美国空军和美国海军尽可能的远征能力; 3.损害美国严重，以至于未来的美国政府将不会考虑介入; 4.扰乱东亚以美国为首的联盟体系“。
谁最终会赢？
虽然法利并不在他的文章宣布胜出，他也解释他的读者认为“战争不上战舰签署了投降结束。相反，它有一个参与者结束殴打，老张，并有可能准备下一轮“下面，法利规定了条件，同时具有美国和中国的胜利：
“为美国的胜利，最好的情况是类似于帝国德国政府在第一次世界大战结束时崩溃，或莱奥波尔多·加尔铁里军政府的马岛战争后崩溃的结果。惨败在战争中，包括计划和中国空军的显著部分的破坏，以及严重的经济困境，可能会削弱中国共产党对中国治理的抓地力。这是一个极其前途未卜的前景，但是，美国不应该对胜利导致了新的转数。
“如果中国赢呢？中国可以要求通过强制将美国拖入住宿于美国目标的胜利，或者取出联盟框架，激励和美国合法化的行动。美国不能继续，如果韩国，日本，台湾战争和菲律宾不再有战斗的兴趣。无论这些都需要做显著损害美国军队及潜在的美国经济。“
这里是事情变得很有趣：
“在美国国内政治的失败的影响将很难预测。在过去，美国已经“丢失”的战争，但这些失败都普遍参与的领域，美国全球利益并不特别重要谈判解决。目前尚不清楚美国的人会如何解释在同行竞争者手中的主要军事上的失败，特别是继续在军事和经济力量增长同行竞争对手。总统和政党，导致美国陷入战争可能会受到极大影响的调查，至少要经过失败的直接冲击磨去“。
真正的危险：“窗口的战争”
要担心了华盛顿和北京之间的未来冲突的最大原因是他们之间的压力点数量庞大：中国东海，台湾，中国南海，朝鲜，网络攻击和/或网络间谍活动，可以去非常错误的，基于空间的军事竞争，提高经济竞争等。随着所有这些似乎已经成熟很快解决随时随地为法利指出“为美国和中国将在所有的可能性，持续时间长。之间的战争窗口”
幸运的是有一些乐观的余地。显然，没有人在任何资本希望看到什么将很可能最终被一战，将是全球性的。然而，寻找到深渊飘飞，有时需要提供对话和来之不易的妥协的清晰度。让我们希望美国和中国领导人正在利用这可能是多年的紧张关系来长远的眼光 - 来实现会有在这样的比赛没有真正的“赢家”。
哈里Kazianis（@grecianformula）是在国家利益中心，在中国政策研究所非居民高级研究员，以及在波托马克基金会国家安全事务资深国防政策非居民高级研究员。他就是国家利益和前主编，首席外交官的前执行编辑。所表达的意见是他自己的。
图片来源：Flickr /中美。海军。



资料来源 :
The National Interest2016.3.4---Harry J. Kazianis :Hell Cometh to Earth: Is a U.S.-China War Really Possible?
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/hell-cometh-earth-us-china-war-really-possible-15404