2016.2.10Kyle Bass致投資者公開信

2016.2.10---Kyle Bass致投資者公開信
(摘要)Kyle Bass :中國5個月內恐爆銀行危機,人民幣未來三年貶30-40%
==Kyle Bass :中國銀行體系可能出現的損失，是美國銀行體系在2008年全球金融危機時損失的4倍或以上。中國政府可能要印10兆元人民幣以補充銀行資本，令人民幣貶值30％~40%。極少人去考量中國問題的成因，第一，人民幣實質匯率自 2005 年開始已狂漲 60%；第二，中國銀行體系在 10 年內膨脹了 1000%，於去年達到 34.5 兆美元，相當於世界銀行 World Bank 估計中國國內生產毛額GDP 10.2 兆美元的 3 倍多，但卻從未爆發虧損循環。，由於中國經濟開始出現裂縫，銀行體系勢必將落入虧損循環，屆時中國央行官員便必須動用 3.3 兆美元的外匯儲備，來替國內銀行增資，而這將造成人民幣大幅貶值。，中國外匯儲備在未來 5 個月內就會降到該水準，銀行業將落入「真正的危險領域」。這不是暫時脫軌，不是遇到減速路障；這是中國過剩──或可稱為資本錯置──的反撲。而當中國將必需調整金融體系與經濟規模之間的平衡時，人民幣便無法維持強勢。

2016.2.10---Kyle Bass致投資者公開信
Dear Investors,
Over the past decade, we have worked diligently to identify anomalies in financial systems, governments, and companies around the world. We have been vigorously studying China over the last year, with the view that the rapid credit expansion in the Chinese banking system will result in significant credit losses that will require the recapitalization of Chinese banks and materially pressure the Chinese currency. This outcome will have many near-term and long-term effects on countries and markets around the world. In other words, what happens in China will not stay in China.
The unwavering faith that the Chinese will somehow be able to successfully avoid anything more severe than a moderate economic slowdown by continuing to rely on the perpetual expansion of credit reminds us of the belief in 2006 that US home prices would never decline. Similar to the US banking system in its approach to the Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”), China’s banking system has increasingly pursued excessive leverage, regulatory arbitrage, and irresponsible risk taking. Recently, we have had numerous discussions with various Wall Street firms, consultants, and other respected China experts, and they almost all share the view that China will pull through without a reset of its economic conditions. What we have come to realize through these discussions is that many have come to their conclusion without fully appreciating the size of the Chinese banking system and the composition of assets at individual banks. More importantly, banking system losses – which could exceed 400% of the US banking losses incurred during the subprime crisis – are starting to accelerate.
Our research suggests that China does not have the financial arsenal to continue on without restructuring many of its banks and undergoing a large devaluation of its currency. It is normal for economies and markets to experience cycles, and a near-term downturn that works to correct the current economic imbalances does not qualitatively change China’s longer-term growth outlook and transition to a service economy. However, credit in China has reached its near-term limit, and the Chinese banking system will experience a loss cycle that will have profound implications for the rest of the world. What we are witnessing is the resetting of the largest macro imbalance the world has ever seen.
So how did we get here? Since 2004, China’s real effective exchange rate has appreciated 60%. The majority of this appreciation occurred in the last few years as the ECB and BOJ both actively targeted weaker exchange rates to stimulate Europe’s and Japan’s large export sectors, respectively. While the markets seem solely focused on China’s exchange rate versus the US dollar, this fixation misses the point that many other manufacturing economies and currencies, including those belonging to Japan, Europe, Russia, and several Southeast Asian countries, have gained significant price advantages at China’s expense. If China is to achieve the required clawback of its real effective exchange rate, the renminbi will need to devalue against a trade-weighted basket of currencies and not just the dollar. In effect, the required devaluation against the dollar will need to be multiplied to achieve the necessary result.
As the renminbi appreciated over the last decade, China undertook a massive infrastructure spending program in order to maintain politically-determined GDP growth targets in the face of these headwinds. This policy action created a system of distorted incentives (not to mention a dramatic misallocation of capital) whereby local officials were promoted to higher office by exceeding those targets without regard to the return on investment of the projects they supported. In 2005, exports and investment constituted 34% and 42% of China’s GDP respectively. By 2014, exports had fallen to 23% and investment had grown to 46%. This growth in investment was funded by rapid credit expansion in China’s banking system, which grew from $3 trillion in 2006 to $34 trillion in 2015.
Today China is at a point where its banking system can no longer support such massive growth, and the strong renminbi has effectively undermined the competitiveness of China’s export economy. A dramatic devaluation of the renminbi is warranted to regain export competitiveness; however, the Chinese authorities have errantly fought against this so far, spending around $1 trillion to defend their currency. The continued capital outflows and emerging need to deal with losses in the banking sector will eventually force China to change tack and allow (or enable) a devaluation that resets growth as many countries have done over the past eight years.
China: Divergence in Bank Asset Growth and GDP
Kyle Bass - China
China’s current situation reminds us of Ireland and Spain, where construction, real estate, and infrastructure investment activity constituted a disproportionate share of economic activity, government revenue, and bank lending. A cyclical downturn in these sectors will have a profound impact on the Chinese economy just as it did in Spain. In fact, Chinese residential real estate investment as a percentage of GDP, which peaked in 2013, was the second highest in global history, only after Spain in 2006, and 60% higher than the US peak in 2005.
“Consider the past quarter century: a credit boom in Japan that collapsed after 1990; a credit boom in Asian emerging economies that collapsed in 1997; a credit boom in the north Atlantic economies that collapsed after 2007; and finally in China. Each is greeted as a new era of prosperity, to collapse into crisis and post-crisis malaise.” – Martin Wolf, Financial Times
China’s Hard Landing
No matter how one analyzes the available data, China’s economy has already started to experience a hard landing. Consider that China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that China’s migrant population (defined as Chinese people that have left their hometown to seek employment or education elsewhere in the country) decreased by 5.7 million people in 2015. This was the first reported decrease in 30 years. This abrupt reverse migration is noteworthy because it signals a slowdown in urban labor opportunities for Chinese workers and could undermine the Chinese urbanization process that has been one of the key pillars of China’s economic growth over the past few decades. The following charts illustrate additional evidence of China’s hard landing. The Largest Banking System Experiment in World History
China has allowed (and encouraged) its banking system to grow into a gargantuan $34 trillion behemoth (a whopping 340% of Chinese GDP). For context, consider what the United States banking system looked like going into the GFC of 2007-2009. On-balance sheet, the US banking system had about $1 trillion of equity and $16.5 trillion of banking system assets (100% of US GDP). If non-banks and off-balance sheet assets are included, it would add another $12.5 trillion to get to about 175% of GDP. US banks lost approximately $650 billion of their equity throughout the GFC. We believe that Chinese banks will lose approximately $3.5 trillion of equity if China’s banking system loses 10% of assets. Historically, China has lost far in excess of 10% of assets during a non-performing loan cycle (The Bank for International Settlements estimated that Chinese banking system losses throughout the 1998-2001 cycle exceeded 30% of GDP).2 We expect losses in this cycle to exceed prior cycles. Remember, 30% of Chinese GDP approaches $3.6 trillion today. Think about how much quantitative easing (QE) the US Fed had to create in order to entice $650 billion of common and preferred equity into the US banks and prevent a Japanese-style deflationary bust. The Fed had to expand its balance sheet by roughly $4.5 trillion.
How significantly will the Chinese central bank have to expand its balance sheet in order to compensate for $3.5 trillion of lost bank capital? What will that do to the renminbi? What will happen to Chinese credit growth and broader Asian credit growth while this happens? If the US Fed’s experience serves as a proxy for what could happen in China, we believe that China will likely have to print in excess of 10 trillion US dollars’ worth of yuan to recapitalize its banking system. The weakening renminbi is just a symptom of the larger banking problems. By the time the loss cycle has peaked, we believe the renminbi will have depreciated in excess of 30% versus the US dollar. For those interested, we have a detailed view on the magnitude of the needed devaluation, which we would be pleased to discuss directly.
We must recognize that China is an emerging market. Emerging market banking systems should never be levered more or be larger than developed market banking systems for a variety of obvious reasons. China’s system is even more precarious when we realize that, even at the biggest banks, loans are not made to borrowers based upon their ability to repay. Instead, loan decisions are political decisions made by the state. Historically, booms and busts are typically driven by rapid credit expansion and then contraction. Credit has never grown faster or larger than it has in China over the past decade. China’s banking system has grown from under $3 trillion to over $34.5 trillion in assets over the last 10 years alone. No credit system in history has ever attempted this rate of growth. There is no precedent.
“There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.” – Ludwig von Mises
The Heart of Darkness: First Signs of Stress within China’s Shadow Banking System
The combination of proscriptive banking regulations and explosive growth of the banking sector has incentivized Chinese banks to find ways to work around the rules. While the most publicized workaround has been the use of Wealth Management Products (WMPs) – devised to circumvent deposit rate caps and loan-to-deposit ratio restrictions – the most insidious is the use of Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs). First, the WMPs. Chinese banks are only allowed to lend out 75% of their deposits in order to restrain lending growth and maintain a healthy balance sheet. WMPs are basically bank savings plans / money market funds that pay higher yields than traditional deposits due to the increased risks they undertake by purchasing corporate bonds as a portion of their investments. WMPs have been used to circumvent deposit-lending restrictions because they are considered non-consolidated assets and liabilities while nonetheless generating fee and spread income for the banks. WMPs offer much higher interest rates to investors than an average deposit, but are fraught with direct credit risk as the market is now coming to understand. Initially, investors bought these WMPs issued by Chinese banks assuming they came with a bank’s guarantee. As WMPs have begun to fail (meaning the underlying WMP asset can no longer cover the WMPs guaranteed interest and principal payments), many issuing banks – but not all – have chosen to uphold the promise to make investors whole. As part of this process, the WMP is brought back onto the bank’s balance sheet (moving from non-consolidated to consolidated). Standard & Poor’s commented last week on WMPs: “A growing reliance on WMPs to manage regulatory capital ratios could undermine the banks’ true capitalization, in our view, because a majority of these off-balance-sheet WMPs just serve as a handy funding tool rather than a channel to offload credit risks.”3 We are beginning to see this occur on Chinese bank balance sheets. In addition, as credit conditions worsen and credit performance rapidly deteriorates, the net issuance of WMPs is collapsing into negative territory.
Now, the TBRs. When loans approach a nonpayment status, Chinese banks typically push them off-balance sheet. Without going into the nuances of exactly how this is done, the basic premise is that the non-performing loan is transferred to a “Trust Company” while the bank continues to be the “guarantor” (i.e. the bank retains all of the credit risk). In exchange, the bank records the “asset” as a Trust Beneficiary Receipt or TBR.
What does this mean for Chinese banks? There is a bad answer and a worse answer. The bad answer is that Chinese bank capital – the equity buffer – is significantly overstated. A TBR requires much less capital to be set aside (only 2.5c as opposed to 11c for an on-balance sheet loan) at the time of origination (anyone thinking Fannie and Freddie?). Adjusting reported bank capital ratios for this effect changes reasonable 8-9% Core Tier 1 capital ratios (CT1) to undercapitalized 5-6% levels.
Now, the worse news. TBRs are one of the biggest ticking time bombs in the Chinese banking system because they have been used to hide loan losses. The table below illustrates how pervasive TBRs are throughout the Chinese banking system. One can make many assumptions regarding the collectability of such loans, but our takeaway is that the system is already full of massive losses. Pay particular attention to the column of the ratio of TBR’s to loans on each bank’s books.
WMPs, TBRs, and the 8,000+ credit guaranty companies constitute the majority of China’s shadow banking system. This system has grown 600% in the last 3 years alone. This is where the first credit problems are emerging, away from the eyes of regulators.
What’s $2 Trillion of Hidden Losses Among Friends?
Standard & Poor’s Weighs in With Strong Language
On January 28th, Standard & Poor’s penned a report on the Chinese banking system which most market participants missed or ignored. The report, entitled “China’s Banks Face Rising Risks From a Slowing Economy and Government Policy”, points out rapidly deteriorating metrics in the Chinese banking system, which supports our view of what is taking place without people paying attention. That a ratings agency that intends to continue doing business with China is calling attention to these issues with such strong language underscores the precarious situation of many of China’s banks. A few excerpts say it all…
“We expect more negative ratings actions this year on Chinese banks.”
“Deterioration in banks’ asset quality is likely to accelerate in 2016. Credit distress has been spreading from a few segments that private companies dominate – such as wholesale and retail trade, export-oriented light industry, shipbuilding, and coal mining—to broad-based manufacturing industries where large firms are common.” So even if the Chinese economy is slowing and bank losses are mounting, doesn’t China have a mountain of reserves?
Crisis Foreign Exchange Reserve Levels – China is Out of Money
Much debate has been focused around the magical $3.2 trillion pile of foreign exchange (FX) reserves currently reported to be held by China (this figure was $4.0 trillion not too long ago and is currently declining at a rate of $100 billion a month). Responses we receive when discussing the FX reserve levels of China are filled with reverence: “No country in the world has ever achieved $4 trillion in FX reserves by running such enormous trade surpluses with the rest of the world.” While true, this analysis fails to frame the proper context of the larger situation. When a host country has a large industrial base, enormous money supply (M2), and large import/export business, there is a certain amount of liquid reserves that are required to run the day-to-day operations of the country (think working capital). Over the years, the IMF has fine-tuned the formula used to calculate this ‘reserve-adequacy’ metric.4 It can be best calculated as follows:
Minimum FX Reserves = 10% of Exports + 30% of Short-term FX Debt + 10% of M2 + 15% of Other Liabilities
For China the equation is as follows:
10% * $ 2.2T + 30% * $ 680B + 10% * (RMB 139.3T / 6.6) + 15% * $ 1.0T = $ 2.7 Billion the required minimum reserves.
Those that cite the size of China’s FX reserves as a security blanket seem to lack a true understanding of the composition and liquidity of China’s stated reserve position. In the table below, we deconstruct China’s official FX reserve position while making our own assumptions regarding the liquidity of China’s investment in its own sovereign wealth fund (CIC):
China’s liquid reserve position is already below a critical level of minimum reserve adequacy. In other words, China is CURRENTLY out of the required level of reserves needed to safely operate its financial system. The view that China has years of reserves to burn through is misinformed. China’s back is completely up against the wall today, which is one of the primary reasons why the government is hypersensitive to any comments regarding its reserve levels or a hard landing. China’s public reaction in its state media to George Soros’ comments in Davos was in character for a country that is on the precipice of a large devaluation. What is extraordinary is the disconnect between the global discussion on China and the reality on the ground. As economic growth has slowed dramatically, bank credit growth accelerated sharply, leaving the banking system vulnerable to large losses.
What Happens Next? – Fasten Your Seatbelts
The troubles in China are much larger than market participants believe. Everyone (including Chinese citizens) knows something is wrong, but few, if any, can put their finger on exactly what it is. The narrative to date has been focused on the symptoms of the problem (i.e. capital outflows and low commodity prices) as opposed to the problem itself. We believe the epicenter of the problem is the Chinese banking system and its coming losses. Once analysts, politicians, and investors alike realize the sheer size of the impending losses and how they compare to the current levels of reserves, all focus will swing to the banking system.
As it is obvious that China’s economy is slowing and loan losses are mounting, the primary question is what are China’s policy options to fix the current situation? We believe that a spike in unemployment, accelerated banking losses / a credit contraction, an old-fashioned bank run, or more likely the fear of one or all of these events, will force Chinese authorities to act decisively. The policy options that China has then are limited to:
Cut interest rates to zero and let the banks “extend and pretend” bad loans – lower interest rates will force more capital abroad putting downward pressure on reserves and the currency. Use reserves to recapitalize its banks – this will reset the banking sector, but wipe out the limited reserve cushion that China has built up, and put downward pressure on the currency. Print money to recapitalize its banks – this will reset the banking sector, but the expansion of the PBOC’s balance sheet will lead to downward pressure of the exchange rate. Fiscal stimulus to revive the economy – this will help some chosen sectors of the real economy, but at the expense of higher domestic interest rates (if not done in conjunction with Chinese QE). The 2009 fiscal stimulus was primarily executed through the banking sector so a similar program would require a properly capitalized banking sector. Also, any increase in Chinese investment would reduce China’s trade surplus and ultimately pressure the currency.
The playbook from policy makers to deal with China’s challenges will likely combine several of the above measures, but ultimately a large devaluation will be a centerpiece of the response. This will allow the Chinese economy to regain the competitiveness it has lost over the past few years.
Chinese officials will realize that a meaningful devaluation is exactly what China needs to help rectify the imbalances that have built over time. Look to Japan, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Europe as examples of countries (or a monetary union in the case of Europe) that have allowed their currencies to depreciate in order to correct the imbalances in their economies. This begs the question of whether governments are going to engage in a full-on currency war. In our view, this has already begun. One only has to look at what BOJ Governor Kuroda said to the Chinese during a panel at Davos last month. He told them to impose stricter capital controls to stem the flow of hot money out of China and to stabilize their
currency. Just one week later, he moved the BOJ to negative rates and devalued the yen 2% versus the renminbi overnight. There is one thing central bankers loathe, and it happens to be free advice.
Once China realizes that it must save its banks (China only has a newly established deposit insurance system with limited coverage and little pre-funding, which could make bank runs very problematic), it will do so. The Chinese government has the capacity and the willingness to do what it needs to do to prevent a banking system collapse. China will save its banks, and the renminbi will be the valve for normalization. It is what any and every government would do if put into a similar situation. China should stop listening to Kuroda, Lagarde, Stiglitz, and Lew and start thinking about how to save itself from the impending disaster in its banking system.
Remember, Bernanke had the subprime crisis wrong when he said it was “contained,” Lagarde and Sarkozy had it completely wrong when they said speculators were the cause of Greece’s problems, and now they all have it wrong when they say China’s problems are due to a simple “communication problem” regarding its FX policy. The problems China faces have no precedent. They are so large that it will take every ounce of commitment by the Chinese government to rectify the imbalances. Risk assets will not be the place to be while all of this is happening.
Once we drew this conclusion in the middle of last year, we decided to liquidate the majority of our risk assets and position ourselves for the various events that are likely to transpire along this long road to a Chinese credit and currency reset. The next 18 months will be fraught with false-starts, risk rallies, and second-guessing. Until China experiences a significant devaluation, it will not be able to cope with the build-up of credit that has helped fuel its rise, but may, in the short-term, be its undoing.
Sincerely,
J. Kyle Bass
Managing Partner


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2016.2.10---Kyle Bass致投资者公开信
尊敬的投资者，
在过去的十年中，我们勤奋工作，以确定金融体系，政府和世界各地的公司异常。我们一直在积极研究中国在过去的一年里，随着认为，中国银行体系的快速信贷扩张会导致显著的信贷损失，这将需要中国的银行进行资本重组和物质施压中国货币。这一成果将对世界各国和市场的许多短期和长期的影响。换句话说，在中国发生的事情不会留在中国。
毫不动摇的信心，中国会以某种方式能够通过继续依赖信贷扩张永久成功避免什么比一个温和的经济衰退更严重的提醒相信在2006年，美国房价绝不会下降的我们。在它的方法来全球金融危机（“GFC”），美国银行系统类似，中国的银行系统越来越追求过度的杠杆，监管套利和不负责任的冒险行为。最近，我们曾与不同的华尔街公司，顾问和其他中国尊重专家的多次讨论，他们几乎都同意这样的观点，中国将渡过难关，而不其经济条件复位。我们都来通过这些讨论，认识到的是，许多人来到他们的结论没有充分理解中国银行体系的规模和资产的个别银行组成。更重要的是，银行系统的损失 - 这可能超过次贷危机期间发生的美国银行业损失400％ - 也开始加速。
我们的研究表明，中国没有金融阿森纳继续在没有重组它的许多银行和经历一个大的贬值其货币。这是正常的经济和市场经历周期，近期的低迷，致力于纠正目前的经济失衡不中国的长期增长前景和转型质的变化，以服务经济。然而，信贷在中国已经达到了短期的限制，而中国的银行体系将体验将会对世界其他地区产生深远的影响亏损周期。我们看到的是世界有史以来最大的宏观失衡的复位。
那么我们是如何来到这里的？自2004年以来，中国的实际有效汇率已经升值60％。大部分这种升值发生在最近几年的欧洲央行和日本央行都积极有针对性较弱的汇率，以刺激欧洲和日本的大型出口部门，分别为。虽然市场似乎只关注中国的汇率兑美元，这个固定忽略了一点，其他许多制造业经济与货币，包括那些属于日本，欧洲，俄罗斯和一些东南亚国家，已在获得了显著的价格优势中国的费用。如果中国要实现其实际有效汇率的要求回拨，人民币将需要贬值兑一贸易加权篮子里，而不仅仅是美元。实际上，对美元所需贬值将需要被相乘以实现必要的结果。
由于人民币升值，在过去十年里，中国为了保持在这些不利因素的脸政治确定的GDP增长目标进行了大规模的基础设施建设支出计划。该策略操作创建的扭曲激励机制（更不用说资本分配不当戏剧性）的系统，使当地官员被超越这些目标，而不考虑他们所支持的项目的投资回报率提升到更高的职位。 2005年，出口和投资占34％和中国的国内生产总值的42％。到2014年，出口量已经下降到23％，投资已​​增长到46％。这种增长的投资是由中国的银行体系，从万亿$ 3成长在2006年到34万亿$，2015年的快速信贷扩张提供资金。
今天，中国正处于一个地步，其银行系统不再能支持如此大规模的增长，而人民币走强，有力地损害了中国的出口经济的竞争力。人民币的大幅贬值是必要的恢复出口竞争力;然而，中国当局错误地反对这种斗争到目前为止，花费大约1万亿$捍卫自己的货币。持续的资本外流和新兴需要处理银行业的损失将最终迫使中国改变方针，并允许（或启用）的重置增长，许多国家已在过去八年里做了贬值。
中国：在三岔口银行资产增长和GDP
凯尔巴斯 - 中国
中国目前的情况提醒爱尔兰和西班牙，建筑，房地产和基础设施投资活动构成的经济活动，政府财政收入和银行贷款中所占份额过我们。这些行业周期性衰退会对中国经济就像它在西班牙做了深刻的影响。事实上，中国住宅房地产投资占GDP的比重达到高峰，在2013年，是全球历史上的第二高，仅2006年西班牙之后，比2005年美国的峰值高60％。
“考虑过去的四分之一世纪：在日本信贷繁荣后，1990年倒塌;在倒塌的1997年亚洲新兴经济体的信贷繁荣;在2007年后倒塌北大西洋经济体信贷热潮;终于在中国。每招呼作为一个新的繁荣时代，崩溃陷入危机和危机后萎靡不振。“ - 马丁·沃尔夫，金融时报
中国的硬着陆
不管怎么一分析数据显示，中国经济已经开始出现硬着陆。考虑到统计中国国家统计局报告说，中国的流动人口（定义为离开自己的家乡寻求就业或教育在国内其他地方的中国人）减少了570万人在2015年这是首次报导在30年内下降。这种突然反向迁移是值得注意的，因为它标志着中国工人在城市劳动力机会放缓，并可能破坏中国的城市化进程，一直是中国经济增长在过去的几十年中的主要支柱之一。下面的图表说明了中国的经济硬着​​陆的其他证据。
在世界历史上规模最大的银行系统实验
中国已经允许（鼓励）其银行系统成长为一个庞大的$ 34个庞然大物万亿（中国GDP高达340％）。对于背景下，考虑一下美国的银行体系看上去就像进入2007 - 2009年全球金融危机。在资产负债表，美国的银行体系有大约1万亿$股权及$ 16.5万亿的银行系统的资产（占美国GDP的100％）。如果非银行资产负债表的资产都包括在内，这将再增加125000亿$去国内生产总值的175％。美国银行损失了大约$ 650十亿他们的权益在整个全球金融危机。我们相信，中国的银行将失去股本约3.5万亿$，如果中国的银行体系失去资产的10％。从历史上看，中国具有不良贷款周期中失去了远远超过资产的10％（在国际清算银行估计，中国银行体系的损失在整个1998 - 2001年周期超过了GDP的30％）。 2，我们预计亏损这个周期将超过之前的周期。请记住，中国国内生产总值的30％，接近今天的3.6万亿$。想想多少量化宽松政策（QE）美国联储怎么过为了吸引$ 650十亿普通股和优先股股权进入美国的银行并防止日本式的通缩萧条创造。美联储不得不通过大约4.5万亿$以扩大其资产负债表。
中国央行将如何显著必须扩大其资产负债表，以弥补3.5万亿$丢失银行资本？什么是会做人民币？会发生什么中国的信贷增长和更广泛的亚洲信贷增长的同时，出现这种情况？如果美联储的经验可以作为在中国会发生什么代理，我们认为中国将可能有超过十万亿美元的价值万元的注资银行系统的打印。弱化人民币升值只是一个更大的银行业问题的症状。的损失周期已经见顶的时候，我们相信人民币将超过30％，兑美元已大幅贬值。对于那些有兴趣，我们有所需的贬值，这是我们很乐意直接讨论的大小的详细视图。
我们必须认识到，中国是一个新兴市场。新兴市场的银行系统不应该被撬开更多或比对各种显而易见的原因，发达市场的银行体系较大。中国的体制是更加危险的时候，我们认识到，即使在最大的银行，贷款不基于其偿还能力的借款人作出。相反，贷款的决定是由国家作出的政治决定。从历史上看，繁荣和萧条通常是通过快速的信贷扩张和收缩，然后带动。信用卡从未增长速度快或比它在过去十年在中国有更大。中国的银行体系已经从下万亿$ 3发展到超过345000亿$以上资产仅在过去10年。在历史上，没有信用体系曾经尝试增长这个速度。没有先例。
“没有回避一个繁荣的最后崩溃的手段，信贷扩张带来的。另一种选择是唯一的危机是否应该早点来进一步信贷扩张自愿放弃的结果，还是后来所涉及的货币体系的最终总灾难“ - 路德维希·冯·米塞斯。
黑暗之心：中国的影子银行体系内应力的先声
的禁止性银行条例和银行业的爆炸式增长相结合，诱因中国的银行想办法解决的规则。虽然最公开的解决方法已利用财富管理产品（WMP产品）的 - 设计来规避存款利率上限和贷存比的限制 - 最阴险的是利用信托受益权（TBRs）。
第一，WMP产品。中国的银行只允许借出自己的存款的75％，以抑制贷款增长，并保持一个健康的资产负债表。 WMP产品基本上都是银行储蓄计划/货币市场基金的支付比传统存款更高的收益率，由于他们通过购买企业债券作为其投资的一部分承担更大的风险。 WMP产品已被用于规避存贷款限制，因为它们被视为非合并资产和负债，同时仍然产生手续费和利差收入对银行。 WMP产品提供更高的利率给投资者比普通存款，而是充满了直接的信用风险作为市场现在来理解。最初，投资者买入这些WMP产品由中国银行承担，他们想出了一个银行担保发行。由于WMP产品已经开始失败（即标的资产WMP不能再覆盖WMP产品保证的利息和本金支付），许多发卡银​​行 - 但不是全部 - 都选择坚持承诺，整个令投资者。作为这一过程的一部分，WMP被带回到银行的资产负债表（从非合并到统一的移动）。标准普尔评论上周WMP产品：“关于WMP产品越来越依赖于管理的监管资本比率可能会削弱银行的真实资本，在我们看来，因为大多数的这些资产负债表外项目WMP产品只是作为一个方便资金的工具而不是一个通道卸载信用风险。“3，我们开始看到这个发生在中国的银行资产负债表。此外，由于信贷状况恶化，信用表现急剧恶化，WMP产品的净发行正在崩溃进入负值区域。
现在，TBRs。当贷款接近拖欠的地位，中国的银行通常把他们的资产负债表。没有进入的正是如何做到这一点的细微差别，其基本前提是，不良贷款转移到了“信托公司”，而银行仍然是“担保人”（即银行保留了所有的信用风险）。作为交换，银行记录的“资产”作为信托受益人收据或TBR。这是什么意思为中国的银行？有一个不好回答，更不会回答。坏的答案是，中国的银行资本 - 股权缓冲 - 是显著夸大。一个TBR需要更少的资金被搁置在始发时间（仅相对于11C为资产负债表内的贷款2.5C）（任何人都想着房利美和房地美？）。调整报导的银行资​​本充足率这一效应改变合理的8-9％的核心一级资本比率（CT1），以资本不足5-6％的水平。
现在，更坏的消息。 TBRs是中国银行体系最大的定时炸弹之一，因为他们已经被用来隐藏贷款损失。下表显示了普遍的TBRs如何在整个中国银行体系。人们可以做出关于此类贷款的可收回许多假设，但我们的外卖是，该系统已经是充满了巨大的损失。要特别注意TBR年代，在每个银行的账簿贷款比率的列。
WMP产品，TBRs和8,000+信用担保公司占大多数中国的影子银行体系。该系统仅在过去的3年里600％。这是第一个信用问题不断涌现，从监管者的眼睛。
什么是$ 2万亿潜亏在朋友的？
标准普尔重量在拥有强大的语言
1月28日，标准普尔公司操刀中国银行体系大部分市场参与者错过或忽视的报告。这份题为“中国的银行面临风险上升从经济放缓与政府政策”，指出了中国银行体系，这支持了我们的东西正在发生没有人关注鉴于迅速恶化的指标。一个评级机构，打算继续与中国呼吁关注这些问题与这样强大的语言做生意强调中国的许多银行的不稳定状况。一些摘录说这一切......
“今年我们期待更多的负面评级行动对中国的银行。”
“恶化银行资产质量很可能会在2016年信贷困境，加快已经从民营企业占主导地位的几个细分传播- 如批发和零售贸易，外向型轻工，造船，煤炭开采对广播写基于制造业由大公司很常见。“
所以，即使中国经济正在放缓，银行损失的安装，没有中国有储量山？
危机外汇储备水平 - 中国是从货币的
许多争论都集中围绕着神奇的$ 3.2万亿堆目前报被中国持有外汇（FX）储量（这个数字是4.0万亿$不久前，目前为每月$ 100十亿的速度下降）。讨论中国的外汇储备水平，当我们收到回应充满了崇敬：“世界上没有一个国家通过与世界其他地区运行如此巨大的贸易盈余曾经取得了外汇储备4万亿$。”虽然如此，该分析失败帧的大形势的适当的范围内。当主机全国拥有众多的工业基础，庞大的货币供应量（M2），大型进口/出口业务，有一个需要运行这个国家的日常的日常运作液体储备一定量的（想想工作资本）。多年来，国际货币基金组织微调用于计算这个准备金充足率“metric.4它可以如下计算最好的公式：
其他负债的最小的FX储备= 10进出口短期FX债务的+ 30％M2 + 10％的％+ 15％
对于中国的方程式如下：
10％* $ 2.2T + 30％* $ 680B + 10％*（人民币139.3T / 6.6）+ 15％* $ 1.0T = $ 2.7万亿所需的最小储备
那些引用中国的外汇储备作为一个安全毯的大小似乎缺乏中国的既定储备头寸的组成和流动性的真正理解。在下面的表格中，我们解构中国官方外汇储备的位置，同时使有关中国在自己的主权财富基金（CIC）投资的流动性我们自己的假设：
中国的液体储备头寸已经低于最低准备金充足率的临界水平。换句话说，中国目前到安全运行的金融体系需要储备所需的水平。中国有多年的储备，以烧透的观点是误导。中国的背部完全靠在墙上的今天，这是主要的原因，政府是过敏的关于其储备水平或硬着陆任何意见之一。在它的官方媒体，以索罗斯在达沃斯评论中国的公众的反应是字符一个国家是一个大贬值的悬崖。什么是非凡是对中国的全球性讨论和地面上的现实之间的脱节。随着经济增长显著放慢，银行信贷增速大幅加快，使银行系统容易受到大的损失。
接下来发生什么？ - 系好安全带
中国的麻烦还远远大于市场人士认为。每个人（包括中国人）知道什么是错的，但很少，如果有的话，可以把他们的手指上到底是什么。叙述迄今一直专注于这个问题（即资本流出和商品价格低），而不是问题本身的症状。我们认为，这个问题的中心是中国银行系统和它的未来的损失。一旦分析师，政治家和投资者都意识到即将发生的损失规模和如何比较储备目前的水平，所有的重点都转向了银行系统。
因为很明显，中国的经济正在放缓，贷款损失安装，主要问题是什么是中国的政策选择，以解决目前的情况如何？我们认为，在失业率飙升，加速了银行的损失/信贷紧缩，一个老式的银行挤兑，或更可能一或所有这些事件的恐惧，将迫使中国当局采取果断行动。中国已经然后是有限的政策选项：
降息至零，让银行“扩展，假装”不良贷款 - 降低利率，将迫使更多的资金投入海外下行压力和储备货币。
用外汇储备注资银行的 - 这将重置银行业，但消灭储量有限的缓冲，中国已经建成，并投入下行压力的货币。
打印的钱进行资本重组它的银行 - 这将重置银行业，但央行的资产负债表的扩张会导致汇率的下行压力。
财政刺激措施振兴经济 - 这将有助于实体经济的一些部门选择，但在较高的国内利率的费用（如果不与中国一起QE完成）。 2009年的财政刺激主要是通过银行部门执行这样一个类似的计划将需要一个适当的资本银行业。此外，在中国投资的增加会减少中国的贸易顺差，并最终迫使该货币。
从政策制定者的剧本，以应对中国面临的挑战可能会结合几个上述措施，但最终大贬值将是应对的核心。这将使中国经济重获竞争力已经失去了过去几年。
中国官员会意识到，一个有意义的贬值正是中国需要帮助纠正有内置随着时间的不平衡。看看日本，俄罗斯，巴西，墨西哥和欧洲（或欧洲的情况下，货币联盟）已经允许其货币，以纠正其经济失衡贬值国家的例子。这就引出了一个政府是否打算搞一个全面的货币战争的问题。在我们看来，这已经开始了。人们只要看一下日本央行行长黑田东彦上个月在达沃斯小组会议期间对中国说。他告诉他们实行严​​格的资本管制，以阻止热钱流出中国，并稳定其 货币。仅仅一个星期后，他搬到日本央行负利率和贬值的日元2％，而人民币过夜。有一件事央行行长厌恶，这恰好是免费的咨询。
一旦中国意识到它必须保存其银行（中国仅有一家新成立的存款保险制度覆盖面有限和小预售资金，这可能使银行挤提很成问题），它会这么做。中国政府有能力和愿意做它需要做的，以防止银行系统崩溃。中国将保存它的银行，人民币将成为规范化的阀门。这是，如果放到一个类似的情况任何和每一个政府会做什么。中国应停止听黑田东彦，拉加德，斯蒂格利茨和Lew和开始思考如何将自己从即将发生的灾难中拯救其银行系统。请记住，伯南克曾在次贷危机问题时，他说，这是“载，”拉加德和萨科齐有它完全错误的，当他们说投机者的希腊问题的根源，现在他们都错了，当他们说中国的问题是由于一个简单的“通信问题”就其外汇政策。该问题中国面临没有先例。他们是如此之大，它会采取承诺的每一点，中国政府整顿的不平衡。风险资产不会被同时这一切正在发生的地方。
一旦我们在去年的中间画了这个结论，我们决定清算我们的大多数风险资产并有可能沿着这条漫长的道路，以中国的信贷和货币复位蒸腾的各种事件定位自己。未来18个月将充满假开始，风险集会和的猜测。直到中国经历显著贬值，这将无法应付的信用已经助长了其崛起的集结，但可能会在短期内，是其失败的原因。
真诚的，
J.凯尔低音
管理伙伴



资料来源 :
Kyle Bass – China’s $34 Trillion Experiment Is Exploding – Full Letter
http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/02/kyle-bass-china/?all=1


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