The National Interest2016.3.1---Ashley Townshend :中国永兴岛的战略意义

The National Interest2016.3.1---Ashley Townshend :The Strategic Significance of China's Woody Island Power Play
China's recent deployments on Woody Island carry a larger strategic significance. Aside from being unmistakable signs of militarization, Beijing's actions highlight both the effectiveness of its strategic expansion into the South China Sea, and the dilemma Washington and others face in crafting a response.
Reports last week that China has sent J-11 fighter jets to Woody Island came less than ten days after satellite images revealed two batteries of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles had been deployed to the disputed island. While provocative, neither deployment is entirely unprecedented. Rather, they represent the latest in a series of incremental steps that Beijing has taken to bolster its strategic foothold in the Paracel Islands.
Since late 2012, China has been steadily upgrading Woody Island's port facilities, radars and military infrastructure. Last year, China finished a brand new airstrip to support large-scale combat operations, and constructed hangars to service and protect forward-based aircraft. Following the U.S. Navy's first freedom-of-navigation operation (FONOP) in October 2015—which took place roughly 700km away in the Spratly Islands—China briefly deployed J-11 fighters to Woody Island, signaling its ability to use the outpost for aerial power projection.
Less than two weeks after America's second FONOP—this time in the Paracel archipelago, about 120km from Woody Island—Beijing reinforced its presence by deploying the HQ-9s, which can strike incoming missiles and aircraft up to 200km away. While this was the third time HQ-9s had been placed on the island, it was their first operational deployment outside of military exercises. Now the J-11s are back, marking what is probably the first time ever that fighter jets and missiles have been simultaneously deployed.
As many have pointed out, these actions show how China is methodically building an anti-access zone to deter the United States and others from operating military forces around the Paracel Islands. They also reveal three broader aspects of China's effective strategic expansion into the South China Sea.
First, Beijing is using American FONOPs as a justification to carry out specific acts of tactical militarization, even as it expands its strategic presence independent of U.S. actions. It's by no means a coincidence that the last two FONOPs were quickly followed by an increase in China's military footprint on Woody Island. This shows Chinese officials have been serious when warning that U.S. naval intrusions might lead Beijing to “strengthen and hasten the build up of relevant capabilities” for island self-defense. However, this tit-for-tat dynamic is only part of the story.
China was building airstrips and other military facilities long before the White House agreed to launch FONOPs. Moreover, the timing of Chinese missile and fighter deployments has not always coincided with perceived American provocations. Beijing's motives, in other words, run deeper than reaction, and have mainly been about ongoing expansion. Of course, at a more fundamental strategic level an action-reaction cycle is becoming entrenched between the United States and China in which elements of the security dilemma loom ever larger. Yet, as far as operational dynamics in the South China Sea are concerned, Beijing is both undeterred by American FONOPs and willing to exploit them as opportunities to step up military deployments.
Second, the highly calibrated way that China is enhancing its strategic and military presence on Woody Island makes it difficult for others to effectively respond. This, to a degree, is Beijing's “salami-slicing” in action. Were China to have deployed military assets in a bolder, faster or more forceful manner, it's possible that Washington and other maritime players would have responded with greater resolve. More importantly, had China reacted to American FONOPs with intimidating aerial and naval intercepts, like those which triggered dangerous incidents in 2013 and 2014, the region would have been far more alarmed—and the risk of miscalculation and conflict significantly increased.
By contrast, deploying small numbers of fighters and missile batteries will not automatically lead to a security crisis. Like the construction of artificial islands, these capabilities gradually advance China's strategic presence at relatively low levels of friction or risk. This makes it particularly tricky to prevent Beijing from militarizing Woody Island, or indeed any of the features it currently controls. Short of physically blocking Chinese efforts to deploy force—which would undoubtedly trigger a major clash—concerned nations must rely on indirect and, to date, largely unsuccessful measures to impose diplomatic, economic or reputational costs.
Finally, the ease with which Beijing is transforming Woody Island into an anti-access hub suggests that China might roll out similar facilities in the Spratly Islands. China has already completed an airstrip on Fiery Cross, and is building two more on Subi and Mischief Reefs, meaning it will soon be able to land military aircraft right across the South China Sea. In fact, J-11 deployments may be expected later this year, perhaps in the wake of a future FONOP. Aircraft shelters and more sophisticated radars—like the high-frequency radar spotted on Reef last month—are also likely to make an appearance, while warships will be able to dock at numerous ports.
Following the Woody Island blueprint, China could deploy surface-to-air missiles in the Spratly Islands at relatively short notice, without constructing dedicated launch sites. Although these, as Sam Roggeveen noted, would need to be protected from corrosion and possibly maintained elsewhere, they would nonetheless provide an effective short-term way to fortify China's controversial artificial islands. Together, the combination of advanced radars, fighters, missile defenses and warships would significantly raise the costs and risks to American ships and aircraft challenging Beijing's South China Sea claims.
China's military deployments on Woody Island are the tip of the iceberg in a much larger and enduring strategic challenge. Although individual capabilities won't tilt the regional balance, the combination of multiple power projection and anti-access platforms on the island will advance Beijing's quietly expanding presence in the Paracel Islands. As a new CSIS map makes depressingly clear, replication of the Woody Island model in the Spratly archipelago would allow Beijing to essentially block out large swathes of the South China Sea. While FONOPs send a defiant message that Washington will not accept any excessive maritime claims, these ephemeral acts pale in comparison with the lasting strategic gains of China's creeping expansion.
Ashley Townshend is a Research Fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Asia-Pacific Cooperation and Governance at Fudan University, Shanghai. He works on international security and strategic affairs with a focus on China, Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, including maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. This article first appeared in the Interpreter. Image: Wikimedia Commons/U.S. Navy.


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The National Interest2016.3.1---Ashley Townshend :中国的永兴岛电力播放的战略意义
中国最近在永兴岛部署携带一个较大的战略意义。除了是军事化的蛛丝马迹，北京的行动彰显其战略扩张进入中国南海的两个实效性和两难华盛顿和别人的脸色在制定响应。
上周报道称，中国已派出J-11战斗机，以永兴岛来了以后不到十天的卫星图像显示，HQ-9面空导弹的两块电池已经部署到有争议的岛屿。虽然挑衅，无论是部署完全是前所未有的。相反，它们代表了一系列北京采取以加强在西沙群岛的战略立足点渐进步骤的最新产品。
自2012年年底，中国一直在稳步提升永兴岛的港口设施，雷达和军事基础设施。去年，中国完成了一个全新的跑道，以支持大规模作战行动，并建造机库以服务和保护向前舰载机。继10月份美国海军的第一个自由的的导航操作（FONOP）2015年，其发生的大致700公里远在南沙，中国简要部署的J-11战斗机，以永兴岛，标志着其使用前哨架空电力的能力投影。
美国第二FONOP，这次在西沙群岛群岛后不到两周，从永兴岛北京120公里通过部署HQ-9，它可以打击来袭导弹和飞机达200公里加强其存在。虽然这是第三次HQ-9已被放置在岛上，这是军事演习外首次作战部署。现在歼-11回来，这标志着什么可能是有史以来第一次战斗机和导弹已同时部署。 正如许多人所指出的那样，这些行动表明，中国是如何有条不紊地建立一个反介入区域，以阻止美国和其他各地的西沙群岛操作军事力量。他们还透露中国的有效的战略扩展到中国南海三个更广泛的方面。
首先，北京正利用美国FONOPs作为理由来进行战术军事化的具体行为，甚至因为它扩大其战略存在独立的美国的行动。这绝不是一个巧合，最后两个FONOPs很快其次是增加中国在永兴岛的军事足迹。这说明警告说美国的海军入侵可能导致北京“加强和加速的相关能力的打造”岛屿自卫时，中国官员一直严重。然而，这种针锋相对针锋相对动态是故事的一部分。
中国正在建设简易机场和其他军事设施没过多久，白宫同意启动FONOPs。此外，中国的导弹和战机部署的时间并不总是与美国的认知挑衅一致。北京的动机，换言之，跑的比反应更深，并且主要被约不断扩大。当然，在一个更​​根本的战略层面的行动反应周期越来越根深蒂固，美国和中国在其中的安全困境元素织机越来越大之间。然而，就在中国南海作战力度而言，北京是由美国FONOPs都偏向虎山行，并愿意利用他们作为机会加紧军事部署。
第二，中国正在加强对永兴岛战略和军事存在的高度校准的方法使他人难以有效应对。这在一定程度上是北京的“腊肠切片”的动作。中国人在一个更大胆，更快或更有力的方式部署军事资产，它可能是华盛顿和其他海事玩家会以更大的决心回应。更重要的是，中国有反应，美国FONOPs与恐吓空中和海上拦截，像那些由此引发危险事故在2013年和2014年，该区域将已经远远报警和误判和冲突显著上升的风险。
相比之下，部署战斗机和导弹电池的小数字不会自动导致安全危机。像人工岛的建设，这些能力在逐渐摩擦或风险水平相对较低推进中国的战略存在。这使得它特别棘手阻止北京军事化永兴岛，或任何它目前控制的功能。短的身体挡住中国人的努力，部署部队，这无疑会引发一场大规模冲突，关注国家必须依靠间接的，到目前为止，基本上不成功，强制推行外交，经济或声誉成本。
最后，其中北京正在改变永兴岛成反接入集线器上的易用性表明，中国可能会推出在南沙群岛类似的设施。中国已经完成了火热的跨简易机场，并建设两个以上的素碧与美济礁，这意味着它将很快能够对面中国南海降落军用飞机。事实上，J-11的部署，可以预计今年下半年，也许在未来的FONOP之后。飞机掩体和更先进的雷达般的斑点去年华阳礁高频雷达一个月也有可能露面，而战舰将能够在众多的港口停靠。
继永兴岛的蓝图，中国可以在相对短的时间内部署在南沙群岛表面对空导弹，无需构建专用发射场。尽管这些，萨姆Roggeveen指出，将需要防腐蚀，并可能在其他地方维护，他们将仍然提供了一个有效的短期办法来加强中国的有争议的人工岛。总之，先进的雷达，战机，导弹防御和军舰的组合将提高显著的成本和风险，以美国的舰艇和飞机挑战北京的中国南海主张。
中国在永兴岛的军事部署是在一个更大，持久的战略挑战的冰山一角。虽然个人能力不会倾斜的区域平衡，岛上多力量投射和反介入平台结合，将推动北京在西沙群岛悄然扩大的存在。作为一个新的地图CSIS使得抑压清楚，在南沙群岛群岛的永兴岛模式的复制将让北京基本上阻挡中国南海的大片。虽然FONOPs发送华盛顿不会接受任何过分的海事赔偿挑衅的消息，这些短暂的行为苍白与中国的蠕胀的持久战略利益比较。
阿什利汤森是一个研究员在悉尼大学美国研究中心和客座研究员在中心亚太合作与治理复旦大学，上海。他的作品在国际安全和战略事务，重点放在中国，东北亚和印度洋 - 太平洋地区，包括东部和南部中国海海事纠纷。这篇文章最早出现在解释器。
图片：维基共享资源/中美。海军。



资料来源 :
The National Interest
The National Interest2016.3.1---Ashley Townshend :The Strategic Significance of China's Woody Island Power Play
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-significance-chinas-woody-island-power-play-15363