Project Syndicate2016.3.2---Nouriel Roubini :2008年再访？

Project Syndicate2016.3.2---Nouriel Roubini :2008 Revisited?
2008 Revisited?
NEW YORK – The question I am asked most often nowadays is this: Are we back to 2008 and another global financial crisis and recession?
My answer is a straightforward no, but that the recent episode of global financial market turmoil is likely to be more serious than any period of volatility and risk-off behavior since 2009. This is because there are now at least seven sources of global tail risk, as opposed to the single factors – the eurozone crisis, the Federal Reserve “taper tantrum,” a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, and a hard economic landing in China – that have fueled volatility in recent years.
First, worries about a hard landing in China and its likely impact on the stock market and the value of the renminbi have returned with a vengeance. While China is more likely to have a bumpy landing than a hard one, investors’ concerns have yet to be laid to rest, owing to the ongoing growth slowdown and continued capital flight.
Second, emerging markets are in serious trouble. They face global headwinds (China’s slowdown, the end of the commodity super cycle, the Fed’s exit from zero policy rates). Many are running macro imbalances, such as twin current account and fiscal deficits, and confront rising inflation and slowing growth. Most have not implemented structural reforms to boost sagging potential growth. And currency weakness increases the real value of trillions of dollars of debt built up in the last decade.
Third, the Fed probably erred in exiting its zero-interest-rate policy in December. Weaker growth, lower inflation (owing to a further decline in oil prices), and tighter financial conditions (via a stronger dollar, a corrected stock market, and wider credit spreads) now threaten US growth and inflation expectations.
Fourth, many simmering geopolitical risks are coming to a boil. Perhaps the most immediate source of uncertainty is the prospect of a long-term cold war – punctuated by proxy conflicts – between the Middle East’s regional powers, particularly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.
Fifth, the decline in oil prices is triggering falls in US and global equities and spikes in credit spreads. This may now signal weak global demand – rather than rising supply – as growth in China, emerging markets, and the US slows. Weak oil prices also damage US energy producers, which comprise a large share of the US stock market, and impose credit losses and potential defaults on net energy exporting economies, their sovereigns, state-owned enterprises, and energy firms. As regulations restrict market makers from providing liquidity and absorbing market volatility, every fundamental shock becomes more severe in terms of risk-asset price corrections.
Sixth, global banks are challenged by lower returns, owing to the new regulations put in place since 2008, the rise of financial technology that threatens to disrupt their already-challenged business models, the growing use of negative policy rates, rising credit losses on bad assets (energy, commodities, emerging markets, fragile European corporate borrowers), and the movement in Europe to “bail in” banks’ creditors, rather than bail them out with now-restricted state aid.
Finally, the European Union and the eurozone could be ground zero of global financial turmoil this year. European banks are challenged. The migration crisis could lead to the end of the Schengen Agreement, and (together with other domestic troubles) to the end of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government.
Moreover, Britain’s exit from the EU is becoming more likely. With the Greek government and its creditors once again on a collision course, the risk of Greece’s exit may return. Populist parties of the right and the left are gaining strength throughout Europe. Thus, Europe increasingly risks disintegration. To top it all off, its neighborhood is unsafe, with wars raging not only in the Middle East, but also – despite repeated attempts by the EU to broker peace – in Ukraine, while Russia is becoming more aggressive on Europe’s borders, from the Baltics to the Balkans.
In the past, tail risks were more occasional, growth scares turned out to be just that, and the policy response was strong and effective, thereby keeping risk-off episodes brief and restoring asset prices to their previous highs (if not taking them even higher). Today, there are seven sources of potential global tail risk, and the global economy is moving from an anemic expansion (positive growth that accelerates) to a slowdown (positive growth that decelerates), which will lead to further reduction in the price of risky assets (equities, commodities, credit) worldwide.
At the same time, the policies that stopped and reversed the doom loop between the real economy and risk assets are running out of steam. The policy mix is suboptimal, owing to excessive reliance on monetary rather than fiscal policy. Indeed, monetary policies are becoming increasingly unconventional, reflected in the move by several central banks to negative real policy rates; and such unconventional policies risk doing more harm than good as they hurt the profitability of banks and other financial firms.
Two dismal months for financial markets may give way in March to a relief rally for assets such as global equities, as some key central banks (the People’s Bank of China, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan) ease more, while others (the Fed and the Bank of England) will remain on hold for longer. But repeated eruptions from some of the seven sources of global tail risk will make the rest of this year – unlike the previous seven – a bad one for risky assets and anemic for global growth.

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Project Syndicate2016.3.2---(Nouriel Roubini :2008年再访？
纽约 - 有人问我最常时下的问题是：我们是否回到2008年，另一个全球金融危机和经济衰退？
我的回答是一个简单的没有，但近期全球金融市场动荡的插曲可能比波动性和避险行为的任何时期更严重的自2009年以来这是因为现在有至少七个全球尾部风险来源，而不是单一的因素 - 欧元区危机，美联储“锥度发脾气”，从欧元区希腊可能退出，以及经济硬着陆在中国 - 这在最近几年已经引起波动。
首先，关于中国经济硬着陆，股市对其可能产生的影响以及人民币币值的忧虑有一个报复回来。而中国更可能有颠簸着陆不是一个很难，投资者的担忧尚未平息，由于持续增长放缓和持续的资本外逃。
其次，新兴市场陷入严重的困境。他们面临着全球的不利因素（中国经济放缓，大宗商品超级周期的结束，从零利率政策，美联储的退出）。许多正在运行的宏观失衡，如双胞胎经常账户赤字和财政赤字，并面对通胀上升和经济增长放缓。大多数人没有实施结构性改革，以提高下垂的增长潜力。而货币走软增加了在过去十年建立起来的债务数万亿美元的实际价值。
第三，美联储可能错在十二月退出其零利率政策。经济增长疲软，通胀率较低（由于油价进一步下降），和更严格的财务状况（通过美元走强，校正股市，和更广泛的信用利差）现在威胁到美国的经济增长和通胀预期。
第四，许多暗流涌动的地缘政治风险是来烧开。也许不确定性的最直接的来源是一个长期冷战的前景 - 通过代理人冲突打断 - 中东地区大国，特别是逊尼派的沙特阿拉伯和什叶派的伊朗之间。
第五，油价的下降引发了美国瀑布和全球股市和尖峰信用利差。现在，这可能预示着全球需求疲软 - 而非供应上升 - 如中国增长，新兴市场和美国放缓。
弱油价也损害美国的能源生产国，其中包括相当大的份额，美国股市，并处净能源出口的经济体，其主权，国有企业和能源企业的信贷损失和潜在的默认值。由于法规从提供流动性，吸收市场波动限制做市商，每一个根本性的冲击成为风险资产价格调整方面更为严重。
六，全球银行由低回报的挑战，因为自2008年以来制定的新规，金融技术的兴起，威胁要破坏他们已受到挑战的商业模式，越来越多地使用消极的政策利率，坏上升的信贷损失资产（能源，大宗商品，新兴市场，欧洲脆弱的企业借款人），以及欧洲运动“保释”银行的债权人，而不是帮助他们摆脱困境，现在有限制的国家援助。
最后，欧洲联盟和欧元区可能会磨今年全球金融风暴的零。欧洲银行面临的挑战。迁移危机可能导致申根协定的结束，（与其他国内问题一起），以德国总理默克尔政府的终结。
此外，来自欧盟，英国的退出变得更加容易。随着碰撞过程中，希腊政府及其债权人再次，希腊退出的风险，可能会返回。右和左民粹主义政党在整个欧洲获得力量。因此，欧洲越来越多的风险解体。顶部全部关闭，其附近是不安全的，与战争肆虐，不仅在中东，而且 - 尽管多次尝试在欧盟斡旋和平 - 在乌克兰，俄罗斯正在成为欧洲的边界更有侵略性，从波罗的海巴尔干。
在过去，尾部风险更偶然，增长恐慌竟然是这一点，政策的反应是有力和有效，从而保持避险情节简单和资产价格恢复到以前的高点（如果不考虑他们甚至更高）。今天，有七个来源的潜在的全球尾部风险，全球经济正从一个贫血的扩展（即加速正增长）转移到经济放缓（即减速正增长），这将导致进一步降低风险资产的价格（股票，商品，信用）全球。
与此同时，已停止和扭转实体经济和风险资产之间的厄运循环的政策正在失去动力。该政策组合是最理想的，因为货币的过度依赖，而不是财政政策。事实上，货币政策正变得越来越标新立异，体现在几个央行负的实际政策利率，此举;和这样的非常规政策风险做弊大于利，因为他们伤害了银行和其他金融机构的盈利能力。
金融市场两惨淡个月可到安慰性反弹的资产，比如全球股市让路三月，因为一些关键的中央银行（中国人民银行中国，欧洲中央银行和日本央行）缓和多了，而另一些（美联储和英国央行）将继续保持更长的时间。但是，从一些七个来源的全球尾部风险反复爆发将会使今年的其余部分 - 不像前七 - 一个坏的风险资产和贫血的全球经济增长。



资料来源 :
Project Syndicate2016.3.2---(Nouriel Roubini :2008 Revisited?
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-financial-crisis-redux-by-nouriel-roubini-2016-03