The National Interest2016.1.18---Peter Navarro :美国现在该不该“放弃”台湾？

2016.1.18---Peter Navarro :Is It Time For America to ‘Surrender’ Taiwan?
During the Cold War the People’s Republic of China lobbed artillery shells at nearby islands controlled by the U.S.-supported Republic of China, based on Taiwan. Twenty years ago the PRC shot missiles into nearby waters to discourage Taiwanese support for independence-minded candidates. Neither policy aided Beijing’s objective of reunification. Since then, the mainland authorities have changed course, encouraging commerce to tie the two peoples together and pointing to Hong Kong as a model of “one country, two systems.” Outgoing ROC President Ma Ying-jeou—representing the Kuomintang Party whose leader, Chiang Kai-shek moved his government from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949 after losing the civil war—supported economic integration, reaching more than a score of agreements with Beijing. The PRC now accounts for 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports, while the number of mainland visitors exceeded four million in 2014.
However, the Taiwanese people voted overwhelmingly on Saturday for Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, which formally advocates an independent Taiwan rather than “one China” encompassing both mainland and Taiwan. The DPP also took control of the Legislative Yuan, which it lacked under the previous DPP president.
The result was a brutal judgment on Ma’s policies and the PRC’s goals. Not only do the vast majority of Taiwanese believe their nation to be independent. They fear growing economic interdependence threatens the autonomy that their nation has maintained despite significant Chinese pressure. In fact, in 2014 the student-led Sunflower Movement occupied the Legislative Yuan’s chamber to protest another trade pact with China negotiated by the Ma government. Only recognition that a declaration of independence would risk a PRC military response has maintained Taipei’s formal acquiescence to the “1992 consensus” of “one China” (interpreted differently by each side). In 2014, just 7.3 percent of Taiwanese supported reunification, barely a third the number in 2003. Most dramatically, China has lost the young. They never lived in the PRC, have no memory of the mainland, and see nothing attractive in Beijing’s governance. Instead, they see ethnic Chinese in what the PRC’s model of coexistence, Hong Kong, futilely demanding the kind of democracy that currently exists in Taiwan.
Even the dramatic meeting last November between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Ma in Singapore, the first such summit, had no apparent impact. Although the two leaders referred to each other as “Mr.” to avoid bestowing legitimacy on the other, it was the PRC which made the real concession, treating Taiwan as an equal. No new policies were advanced, only a warning issued by Xi. Anyone retreating from the 1992 consensus of “one China” risked causing cross-strait relations to “encounter surging waves, or even completely capsize.”
Taiwanese voters ostentatiously ignored his counsel. True, Tsai promised not to risk anything which would sink Taiwan: “We must ensure that no provocation or accidents take place.” She nevertheless insisted: “Our democratic system, national identity and international space must be respected.” And she has notably not endorsed the “one China” formulation, which sets Taipei and Beijing on a possible collision course.
After Tsai’s victory in what the PRC termed a ‘regional election,’ Beijing made its sentiments clear. The Foreign Ministry insisted: “There is only one China in the world, the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will not brook being broken up.” Official media outlets declared independence to be a “hallucination” and that movement toward independence was “poison.” The Taiwan Affairs Office expressed its willingness to engage “any parties and groups that recognize that the two sides belong to one China” and rejected “any form of secessionist activities seeking ‘Taiwan independence’.”
Xi knows Taiwan, having served in Fujian Province across the strait from 1995 to 2002, the last three years as governor. Yet that might not be a benefit. His experience is dated: Taiwanese sentiment has since hardened against reunification. Moreover, his appearance of knowledge, as well as his centralization of power, reportedly limits the advice that he receives on the issue.
The U.S. State Department responded circumspectly to Tsai’s victory, proclaiming America’s “profound interest in the continuation of cross-Strait peace and stability.” But Washington’s current ambiguous commitment to Taiwan creates more risks than certainties.
The two countries retain an unofficial relationship; America is committed to providing “defensive” weapons. The United States has left unsaid whether it would intervene militarily in a conflict. Washington hopes China will assume ‘yes’ while Taipei will not feel safe enough to antagonize the PRC. Under the last DPP presidency, however, the ROC authorities appeared to take American support for granted while Beijing believed Washington to be bluffing: the United States wouldn’t risk Los Angeles for Taipei, opined one Chinese general. “Strategic ambiguity” is proving to be a particularly dangerous game to play with a rising, nationalistic power over interests it views as vital. A clash over empty rocks in the South China Sea would be dangerous enough. A fight over Taiwan, a vibrant democracy of 23 million people with globe-spanning economic ties, would be catastrophic. Even if America were not directly involved, its relationship with the PRC would be wrecked. Global markets would panic, even the Europeans would be forced to impose economic sanctions, China’s neighbors would inaugurate an arms race, interest in nuclear weapons would rise in Japan, and Beijing’s quest for international acceptance would crash. That would be a very high price to pay for physical reunion with the recalcitrant island, especially if no fundamental Chinese interests were being threatened at the time.
Which suggests a need for informal discussions about a long-term modus vivendi. Put formal reunification to the side, since it won’t happen quickly or peacefully when at least 80 percent of Taiwan’s population opposes the idea. Then what?
First, everyone affirm a commitment to a peaceful solution. Taipei would announce its neutrality, including in any conflict involving the United States. Thus, China need not worry about Taiwan being used as a base of operations against the mainland. Washington would indicate that while it plans to continue supplying Taiwan with defensive weapons, it has no intention of intervening in a cross-strait conflict, despite its historical ties to the ROC. The PRC would affirm that it expects to settle the sovereignty issue peacefully and dismantle missiles currently positioned to strike the island. As the Taiwan-China relationship improves, U.S.-Taiwan arms sales should diminish as an issue.
Second, Beijing and Taipei would continue to expand commercial relations, encourage tourism and engage in political talks. The two also would preserve the present informal compact, which restricts the ROC’s international stature but preserves its existing space. In areas of health and safety the PRC would back an increased international role for Taiwan. Nonpolitical contacts would continue to expand rapidly while political ties would be left to develop more slowly and cautiously.
Third, other nations would maintain robust economic ties with Taiwan and emphasize to China the importance of a peaceful resolution of any cross-strait issues. While no one, whether in Asia, Europe or elsewhere, would want to take sides in a war, many nations would find it impossible to maintain a “business as usual” attitude after PRC aggression. The threat of economic and diplomatic retaliation would help ensure that the “prize” was not worth the price. In contrast, Chinese forbearance would demonstrate that Beijing was moving into an increasingly important global leadership role.
It’s hard not to admire the Taiwanese, determined to elect who they wish rather than who their large neighbor next door prefers. Hopefully this democracy with Chinese characteristics will provide a model for people on the mainland. In any case, everyone involved must realize that instability and war would serve no one’s interest. There’s no cause to hurry decisions on cross-strait issues, leaving lots of time to find creative approaches to satisfy both sides. Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire (Xulon).

Image: Flickr/John Y. Can.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/it-time-america-%E2%80%98surrender%E2%80%99-taiwan-14955


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The National Interest2016.1.18---Peter Navarro :美国现在该不该“放弃”台湾？
在冷战期间，中国人民共和国投掷炮弹由中国美国支持的共和国，根据台湾控制的附近岛屿。二十年前，中国的导弹拍摄到附近海域，以阻止独立意识的候选人台湾的支持。无论是政策援助统一北京的目标。
从那时起，内地当局已改变航向，鼓励商业扳平两国人民一起，指向香港作为“一个国家，两种制度。”即将离任的中华民国总统马英九，代表国民党党的领袖的典范，蒋介石失去了内战，支持经济一体化，达到了与北京的协议多得分后，提出他的政府从大陆到台湾于1949年。中国目前占40％，台湾的出口，而内地游客人数突破400万美元的2014年。
然而，台湾人民以压倒性多数投票上周六蔡英文的民进党，正式主张台湾独立，而不是“一个中国”既包括大陆和台湾。民进党也参加了立法院，它在以前的民进党总统缺乏控制。
其结果是对马英九的政策及中国的目标，一个残酷的判断。不仅台湾的绝大多数认为他们的国家要独立。他们担心不断增长的经济相互依存威胁的自主权，他们的国家一直保持着，尽管显著中国的压力。事实上，在2014年学生领导的向日葵运动占据了立法院的房间，抗议另一个贸易协定​​与中国在马政府谈判。
只有认识到独立将冒险中华人民共和国军事反应的宣布，维持台北正式默许“九二共识”，“一个中国”的（由每边有不同的解释）。在2014年，仅仅7.3％的台湾人支持统一，几乎三分之一的在2003年最显着数字，中国已经失去了年轻的。他们从来没有住在中国，有内地没有记忆，什么也看不见的吸引力在北京的治理。相反，他们看到的种族中国在什么并存的中国的模式，香港，徒劳苛求这种民主当前存在于台湾。
即使是中国国家主席习近平与马之间的去年11月在新加坡，第一次这样的首脑会议上引人注目的，没有明显的影响。尽管两位领导人简称对方为“先生”，以避免对其他赠与的合法性，这是中国这使得真正的让步，处理台湾作为一个平等的。没有新的政策非常先进，只有夕发出了警告。任何人从“一个中国”的共识，1992年撤退冒着造成两岸关系“遭遇汹涌的海浪，甚至完全倾覆。”
台湾选民夸张地忽略了他的律师。诚然，蔡承诺不冒任何风险，这将下沉台湾：“我们必须确保没有任何挑衅或意外事故发生”，她仍坚持说：“我们的民主制度，民族认同和国际空间必须得到尊重。”而她尤其不赞同“一个中国”的提法，这台台北和北京的一个可能的碰撞过程。
之后蔡的胜利在什么中国称为“地区选举，”北京做出了情绪明确。外交部坚持说：“世界上只有一个中国，在世界，大陆和台湾同属一个中国，中国的主权和领土完整，不会容忍被打破了。”宣布独立是“幻觉”的官方媒体和走向独立的运动是“毒药”。台湾事务办公室表示愿意参与“的承认两岸同属一个中国的任何党派和团体”，并拒绝“任何形式的追求”台独“分裂活动。”
曦知道台湾，两岸曾担任福建省1995〜2002年，在过去三年担任州长。然而，这可能不是一个好处。他的经历的日期是：台湾的情绪，因为硬化反对统一。此外，他的出现知识，以及他的中央集权，据说限制了他收到关于这一问题的建议。
美国国务院回应慎重蔡琴的胜利，宣告美国“在两岸的和平与稳定继续浓厚的兴趣。”但华盛顿目前的模棱两可的承诺，台湾创造超过确定性风险更大。
两国保持非官方关系;美国承诺提供“防御性”武器。美国一直没说是否会军事介入冲突。华盛顿希望中国承担“是”，而台北也不会觉得足够安全对抗中国。在过去的民进党总统，但是，中华民国政府似乎认为理所当然美国的支持，而北京认为，华盛顿唬人：美国不会冒险洛杉矶台北，opined一位中国将军。 “战略模糊”已经被证明是一个特别危险的游戏有一个上升，民族主义的力量在它认为的切身利益发挥。
冲突在闲置的岩石在中国南海将是危险的不够。一场打斗过台湾，23万人遍布全球的经贸关系充满活力的民主国家，将是灾难性的。即使美国不直接参与，它与中国的关系将被破坏。全球市场将会崩溃，甚至欧洲人将被迫实施经济制裁，中国的邻国将开创军备竞赛，核武器的兴趣将会上升，日本和北京寻求国际认可将崩溃。这将是一个非常高的价格，为物理团聚与顽抗岛付出，特别是如果没有根本性的中国的利益正在受到威胁的时候。
这表明需要大约一个长期的权宜之计非正式讨论。将正式回归到一边，因为它不会很快发生，或安静时，至少有80％的台湾居民反对的想法。然后呢？
首先，大家肯定和平解决的承诺。台北将宣布中立，包括涉及美国的任何冲突。因此，中国不必担心台湾被用作对大陆行动的基地。华盛顿将表明，虽然它计划继续与防御性武器供应台湾，无意介入两岸冲突，尽管它的历史联系的中华民国。中国非常肯定，预计解决主权问题的和平和拆除当前位于罢工岛导弹。由于台湾与中国关系改善，美台军售应减少是一个问题。
其次，北京和台北将继续扩大经贸关系，鼓励旅游和从事政治谈判。双方还就维持目前的非正式紧凑，这限制了中华民国的国际地位，但保留了其生存空间。在健康和安全中国将支持增加国际作用的台湾地区。非政治性的接触将继续迅速扩大，而政治关系将留待发展比较缓慢，谨慎。 三，其他国家将保持与台湾的强劲的经济关系，并强调对中国的任何两岸问题和平解决的重要性。虽然没有人，无论是在亚洲，欧洲或其他地方，将要采取双方在战争中，许多国家会发现它不可能保持“照常营业”中国侵略后的态度。经济和外交报复的威胁，将有助于确保“奖”是不值得的代价。相比之下，中国的忍耐将表明，北京正在朝着成为一个越来越重要的全球领导作用。
这很难不佩服台湾人，决心要选出他们希望，而不是谁是他们的大隔壁的邻居更喜欢谁。希望这个民主有中国特色将提供一款型号为大陆人民。 在任何情况下，每个人都参与必须意识到，动荡和战争将成为任何人的利益。有没有理由匆忙决定对两岸问题，留下大量的时间去寻找创造性的方法，以满足双方。
道格·班铎是在美国卡托研究所高级研究员。一位前特别助理，罗纳德·里根总统，他所创作和几本书，其中包括外国愚蠢编辑：美国新的全球帝国（Xulon）。
图片来源：Flickr /约翰Y.灿。